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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through ) 
Utah State Department of ) 
Social Services, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent ) 
) Case Number: 890477-CA 
CRAIG MISMASH, ) 
) Court of Appeals Number: 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 890477-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
COMES NOW THE RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF to the above entitled 
action, by and through counsel and hearby submits the 
Respondent's brief in this matter: 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Defendant/Appellant is appealing a District Court order, 
denying its Motion for Summary Judgment in a case brought by the 
State of Utah, Department of Social Services to establish 
paternity and collect child support from the Defendant/appellant. 
Defendant/appellant makes the same argument on appeal as he made 
before the trial court: that this paternity suit should be 
dismissed with prejudice based upon the affirmative defense of 
laches. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. 
78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court properly deny the defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of laches? 
2. Should laches ever be an available defense in a 
paternity action when the suit is brought before the child that 
is the subject of the litigation reaches the age of majority? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rules 8(c) and 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 
are determinative of issue number one in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah had great difficulty locating 
defendant/appellant in 1972 when the subject child was born. The 
State finally located him in 1978 and promptly filed a paternity 
suit against the Appellant/Defendant that same year. 
Appellant/Defendant answered the complaint and was represented by 
his attorney Matt Biljanic. However, Appellant/Defendant refused 
to comply with the court's blood test order. Finally, Matt 
Biljanic withdrew from representing appellant/defendant because 
he was uncooperative. (R. 7). For procedural reasons, the State 
was unable to obtain a default paternity judgment. 
The State was unable to locate defendant/appellant until 
1984, when the State promptly filed another petition for 
paternity. After several attempts, the case was dismissed for 
lack of personal service. Finally, in 1987 this suit was filed 
and the State obtained personal service over the 
defendant/appellant. 
During the period from June 1979 through August 1986, the 
mother of the child in question went off public assistance 
several times and would not fully cooperate with the State of 
Utah. The State could not proceed without her cooperation. 
Presently, the mother is very cooperative and wishes to finally 
resolve all issues as soon as possible. 
The trial court noted that the State of Utah had made 
reasonable efforts to establish paternity, but was unable to do 
so at an earlier date due partly to the actions of the 
defendant/appellant. (R. 15) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant/appellant failed to show the nonexistence of 
certain issues of fact that were necessary to support his claim 
of laches. Defendant/appellant had the burden of proving 
certain facts to support his defense. However, not only did he 
fail to submit any factual evidence to support his claim, but the 
evidence that was submitted unequivocally supports the State's 
assertion that laches does not apply in this case. 
Further, laches should never be a defense in a paternity 
proceeding that is brought when the subject child is a minor 
because of the inherent rights of the child and the State that 
are involved in a paternity proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court order should be affirmed for the 
following reasons: 
POINT ONE 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF PACT EXIST WHICH PREVENTED THE DISTRICT 
COURT FROM RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF LACHES 
The record from the lower court clearly reveals that many 
issues of material fact exist in this case. The Utah Supreme 
Court ruled years ago that a summary judgment movant must show 
that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists. Young v. 
Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 (1952). However, the State 
provided credible evidence that it did not unreasonably delay 
this matter, but that it is the defendant who has continually 
delayed these proceedings (R. 7). 
The State showed to the District Court that this matter 
would have been resolved in 1978. However, the 
appellant/defendant refused to even cooperate with his own 
attorney in addition to the District Court and the State. (R. 7) 
The State further showed that the mother did not always cooperate 
with the State which further inhibited the State's ability to 
pursue this matter. 
Appellant/defendant clearly misrepresents the record of the 
lower court by alleging in his brief "no one had ever approached 
him claiming he was the father" of the subject child. (Appellant 
Brief page 5). He would have this Court believe that the State 
did nothing to resolve this paternity issue. However, 
appellant/defendant counsel admitted to the low€»r court that the 
State had pursued him well before 1987 (R. 13). 
Further, Appellant/defendant does not cite to the lower 
court's record in support of any of his contentions on this 
appeal as required by Rule 24(e) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. However, it is very clear from the record that the 
State did not delay unreasonably in bringing this action (R. 15). 
The trial court found specifically that the 
Appellant/defendant actually delayed this matter (R. 15). It is 
a well known maxim in courts of equity that a person who causes a 
delay cannot claim prejudice from such a delay. [See In Re 
Estate of Novolich, 500 P.2d 1297 at 1301 (Wa. App. 1972) and 
Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136 at 1145 (Kan. 1978)]. 
It is therefore, very clear that summary judgment in favor of 
appellant was not warranted. 
POINT TWO 
APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH FACTS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT 
HIS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LACHES 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically 
states that Laches must be pleaded as an affirmative defense. 
Rule 56(c) further states, 
...The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.... 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) 1953, as amended. 
Inherent in both of these rules, with respect to asserting an 
equitable defense, is the requirement of the moving party to 
prove the facts necessary to establish, as a matter of law, the 
affirmative defense of laches. However, appellant failed to 
properly even allege the facts necessary to establish his laches 
defense. 
Appellant must first allege that the State unreasonably 
delayed initiating these proceedings and that such delay has 
prejudiced appellant's position at trial. However, appellant 
failed to rely upon any discovery, affidavits, or admissible 
evidence either establishes or alleges that the State 
unreasonably delayed causing prejudice to appellant. Therefore, 
in reality, appellants motion of summary judgment was identical 
to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
However, appellant's answer to the State's complaint fails 
to allege and certainly fails to establish an unreasonable delay 
causing prejudice to appellant. A party cannot merely allege 
that a claim is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, as 
appellant does, and expect to prevail on an affirmative defense. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that bare contentions cannot 
resolve issues of fact crucial to the resolution of the case. 
Frisbee b. K & K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387 at 390 (Utah 1984). 
Case law is clear that a party may bring a motion to dismiss 
based upon laches, but only if the pleadings clearly show 
unreasonable delay plus prejudice. Conti v. Board of Civil 
Service Commissioners, 461 P.2d 617 at 624 (CA 1969). 
Because appellant failed to even alleged through his 
pleadings, discovery, affidavits, or other admissible evidence, 
the District Court had no choice, but to deny his motion for 
Summary Judgment. Appellant's mere proffering of alleged facts 
through his attorney is insufficient. 
Further, Appellant's proffer of prejudice is irrelevant to a 
laches defense. Appellant continues to allege that he has been 
prejudiced because he lost several years of visitation with the 
subject. However, the only prejudice that is relevant to a 
laches claim is the kind that harms a person's position at trial. 
However, appellant has not petitioned the Court for visitation. 
Therefore, appellant's proffer of alleged facts is insufficient 
to establish anything as a matter of law and it is also 
irrelevant to the issue of prejudice. 
At best appellant only raised more issues of fact in this 
proceeding. However, it is very clear that summary judgment is 
not used to determine facts, but only to ascertain whether there 
are any material issues of fact in dispute. Hill ex rel. Fogel v. 
Grand Cent., Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970). 
Moreover, appellant cannot cite any authority to support his 
position. 
Appellant/defendant only cites two cases in his brief, 
neither of which support his position. One case deals with 
commercial matters. The other case, Borland v. Chandler, only 
states that laches may apply to a case at law, but the court 
refused to apply laches to the paternity proceeding before the 
court. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 at 146 (Utah 1987). 
However, all cases on the subject hold that the party asserting 
laches must show that a party unreasonably delayed and that such 
delay will prejudice another party's case at trial. 
Appellant failed to establish or even allege unreasonable 
delay or prejudice, therefore, the trial court's ruling is 
proper. 
POINT THREE 
THERE ARE MANY LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REASONS WHY LACHES SHOULD 
NEVER BE AN AVAILABLE DEFENSE IN A PATERNITY PROCEEDING THAT 
IS BROUGHT WHEN THE SUBJECT CHILD IS A MINOR 
Respondent is unaware, after extensive research, of any 
cases in the United States where a paternity action was barred or 
dismissed based upon the equitable doctrine of laches. Most 
jurisdictions realize that while laches may apply generally to 
actions at law or equity, important legal and equitable reasons 
should prevent its application in certain clear categories of 
cases. 
The first and most important reason why laches should never 
be a defense in a paternity proceeding brought while the child is 
a minor is that the interest of the child and society are harmed. 
If laches is a successful defense a child could be deprived of 
its ability to obtain past, present, and future* child support. 
Society is in turn harmed because it is the policy of this State 
to require that every father support his children (see generally 
U.C.A. 78-45-3). 
The state and the mother are, in the vast majority of cases, 
the only possible persons who will ever pursue a putative father 
to gain support for the child. Further, Utah Courts have on 
several occasions ruled that child support is a right owed to the 
child, and not the custodial parent. Race v. Race, 740 P. 2d 253 
at 256 (Utah 1987). Therefore, equity should preclude a ruling 
where actions of the state or the mother prejudice the rights of 
child. 
Many states have specifically ruled that laches is not 
available in a paternity proceeding because of the interests of 
the child that are involved. A Washington court ruled that 
laches did not bar a paternity action first commenced 13 years 
after the birth of the subject child. Nettles v. Beckley, 648 
P.2d 508 at 510 (Wash. App. 1982). The court held: 
The right of an illegitimate child to assert a claim for 
parental support is too fundamental to permit its forfeiture 
by its mother's failure to timely institute a paternity 
suit. (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 510. Washington is one example among many states that 
will not allow laches to bar paternity suit. Utah is certainly 
no less protective of its children. Therefore, laches should not 
be available in a paternity proceeding in Utah. 
Second, many states have refused to allow a laches defense 
to a statutory proceeding before the applicable statute of 
limitations has run. The logic behind this view is that laches 
is a defense that was previously only applicable to equity 
proceedings where statutes of limitations do not exist. However, 
in cases at law, such as this paternity proceeding, specified 
statutory limits exist to protect a party against delay. 
Since courts of equity and law have merged, an incongruity 
exists in certain areas as is the case of laches and the statute 
of limitations. Both purport to prevent stale claims. However, 
because many courts have ruled that a party has a right to rely 
upon the time period prescribed by law, many jurisdictions have 
simply ruled that laches only applies to a proceeding that may be 
somehow brought after the applicable statute of limitations has 
run. 
In a divorce proceeding to collect past due child support a 
Washington court ruled, "absent unusual circumstances, the 
doctrine of laches should not be invoked to bar an action short 
of the applicable statue of limitation." Hunter v. Hunter, 758 
P.2d 1019 at 1023 (Wash. App. 1988). See generally 30A C.J.S. 
Section 131. 
Further, even states that have not fully merged equitable 
and legal defenses will apply the applicable statute of 
limitations by analogy when determining the issue of delay in a 
laches defense. See Rise v., Steckel, 652 P.2d 364 at 370 (Or. 
App. 1982). 
In Utah, as in most states, the statute of limitations for 
bringing a paternity suit is tolled while the subject child is a 
minor. The only applicable statute that governs limitations in a 
paternity proceeding is U.C.A. 78-45-3 which limits a putative 
father's liability for past support to four years preceding the 
filing of the complaint. Although this statute does not affect 
when a suit may be brought, it does protect a putative father 
from having a judgment entered against him for 18 years of past 
support. 
While Utah does not have a specific provision dictating when 
a paternity proceeding must be commenced, the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that whatever period may apply shall be tolled while the 
child is a minor. Szarak v. Sandolval# 636 P. 2d 1082 at 1084 
(Utah 1981). Therefore, if the applicable period is four years, 
a paternity proceeding may be commenced before the child reaches 
the age of 22. 
If by law, in a statutory paternity proceeding, the statute 
of limitations is tolled until the child reaches the age of 
majority, a party should not be allowed to circumvent such a law 
by asserting that the suit should be barred on equitable grounds 
after only 13 years. 
This is much legal authority across the country that 
supports that laches should never apply to a statutory cause of 
action. However, the State only asking that the Court of 
Appeals rule that laches in not available in a paternity 
proceeding commenced while the child is a minor. Such a ruling 
would be congruent with and based upon the same reasoning as was 
applied to the tolling of the statute of limitations in paternity 
actions. 
Finally, laches should never be applied to bar the state 
from enforcing public welfare laws. The Supreme Court of Oregon 
summed this principle best ruling, 
By the great weight of authority in this country the defense 
of laches in not available against the government, state or 
national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or 
protect a public interest.... 
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co v. State Land Board, 439 P.2d 575 at 
581 (OR 1967). See also Big Piney Oil & Gas v. Wyoming Oil & 
Gas, 715 P.2d 557 at 560 (WY 1986) and Arizona Law Enforcement 
Merit System v. Dann, 652 P.2d 168 at 172 (Ariz. App. 1982). 
Because it is the policy of this state, supported by state 
law and federal regulations, to collect support from putative 
fathers and because such collection help to reduce the tax burden 
of Utah citizens, laches should never bar a claim brought by the 
State to obtain reimbursement of public assistance monies 
expended and to collect child support for a custodial parent. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant failed to show the nonexistence* of issues of 
material facts necessary to support his claim for laches. 
Further, appellant failed to properly allege facts necessary to 
support an affirmative defense. Therefore, the trial court 
clearly was well within his discretionary powers by denying 
appellant/defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon 
laches. 
In addition to the facts of this particular case, laches 
should never apply to any paternity proceeding commenced while 
the subject child is a minor. If laches prevails, it is the 
child and society that are harmed, not the mother or the 
Department of Social Services. The same reasons underlying the 
tolling of the statute of limitations in a paternity proceeding 
are applicable to a claim for laches. 
WHEREFORE! Respondent/plaintiff respectfully asks this court 
to uphold the lower courts denial of Appellant/defendant's motion 
for summary judgment and further asks this court to rule that 
laches is not available in a paternity proceeding commenced when 
the subject child is a minor. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day January, 1990. 
FRANK D. 
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